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Abstract
Cognitive radio (CR) promises to be a solution for the spectrum underutilization problems. However, security issues
pertaining to cognitive radio technology are still an understudied topic. One of the prevailing such issues are
intelligent radio frequency (RF) jamming attacks, where adversaries are able to exploit on-the-fly reconfigurability
potentials and learning mechanisms of cognitive radios in order to devise and deploy advanced jamming tactics. In
this paper, we use a game-theoretical approach to analyze jamming/anti-jamming behavior between cognitive radio
systems. A non-zero-sum game with incomplete information on an opponent’s strategy and payoff is modelled as an
extension of Markov decision process (MDP). Learning algorithms based on adaptive payoff play and fictitious play are
considered. A combination of frequency hopping and power alteration is deployed as an anti-jamming scheme. A
real-life software-defined radio (SDR) platform is used in order to perform measurements useful for quantifying the
jamming impacts, as well as to infer relevant hardware-related properties. Results of these measurements are then
used as parameters for the modelled jamming/anti-jamming game and are compared to the Nash equilibrium of the
game. Simulation results indicate, among other, the benefit provided to the jammer when it is employed with the
spectrum sensing algorithm in proactive frequency hopping and power alteration schemes.
Keywords: Jamming; Anti-jamming; Game theory; Stochastic game; Non-zero-sum game; Fictitious play; Adaptive
play; Markov models; Frequency hopping; Power allocation; Smart transmission layer
1 Introduction
Cognitive radio (CR) [1] is a technological breakthrough
that - by utilizing concepts of dynamic spectrum access
(DSA) and opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) - is
expected to bring about means for better radio frequency
spectrum utilization.
In order to access spectrum opportunistically, CRs need
to be able to acquire information related to the spec-
trum holes. Currently, there are three establishedmethods
allowing the cognitive radios to retrieve the spectrum
occupancy information. Among them, spectrum sens-
ing [2] has been given the most focus in the research
community.
Different spectrum sensing approaches, such as energy
detection [3], matched filters [4], various feature detection
methods (e.g., cyclostationary) [5], and hybrid methods
[6] have been proposed and analyzed in the past. These are
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mainly differentiated by their computational complexity
(energy detection being the most computationally effi-
cient, thus simplest to implement), necessity for a priori
knowledge of the observed signals (matched filters), and
the means of extracting features of the recognized signals
(feature detectors).
Alternative approach to acquiring spectrum informa-
tion is utilized by the geolocation/database-driven CRs
[7]. This method requires the CRs to have a perfect aware-
ness of their geographical position and to be able to access
a database containing the list of the currently available
frequencies at a given location.
Another alternative method is the beacon signals
method [8], which relies on the usage of beacon rays for
providing the prospective CRs information regarding the
currently unused channels in their proximity.
As useful as the newly introduced cognitive abilities
and on-the-fly reconfigurability prospectives of cognitive
radios may be for the functioning of the future wire-
less communication systems, they also inherently bring
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a new set of security issues [9] that need to be prop-
erly addressed. Among them, primary user emulation
attacks [10], spectrum sensing data falsification attacks
[11,12], eavesdropping attacks [13], and intelligent jam-
ming attacks [14,15] were given particular attention in the
research community.
Radio frequency (RF) jamming attacks may be defined
as illicit transmissions of RF signals aimed at disrupt-
ing the normal communication on the targeted channels.
Adversaries that utilize the CR learning mechanisms to
improve their jamming capabilities are considered intelli-
gent. Intuitively, being equipped with such learningmech-
anisms may also aid the legitimate users in improving
their anti-jamming capabilities. The goals of legitimate
transceivers and jammers are typically negatively corre-
lated. For this purpose, game theory - a mathematical
study of decision-making in situations involving conflicts
of interest - has emerged as a tool for formalization of the
intelligent jamming problems.
Most of the previous works in the literature on applica-
tion of game theory to jamming problems consider either
channel surfing or the power allocation as anti-jamming
strategies. Furthermore, they are mutually differentiated
mostly by the objective function subjected to optimization
(signal-to-noise ratio, bit error rate, Shannon capacity),
various forms of uncertainty (user types, physical pres-
ence, system parameters), game formulation (zero-sum
vs. non-zero-sum, single-shot vs. dynamic), learning algo-
rithms (Q-learning, SARSA, policy iteration), etc.
In [16], authors have proven the existence and unique-
ness of Nash equilibrium for a class of games with trans-
mission cost. In addition, they have derived analytical
expressions for the Nash equilibrium and have formulated
the jamming game as the generalization of the water-
filling optimization problem. Jamming game for OFDM
system with 5 channels was analyzed.
Authors in [17] have formulated the problem of jam-
ming in CR networks with primary users as a zero-sum
stochastic game, where channel hopping was considered
as the anti-jamming scheme and minimax-Q as the learn-
ing algorithm. They have compared the performance of
the developed stationary policy with the myopic deci-
sioning policy which did not consider the environment
dynamics.
Themethod was extended in [18], comparing the results
of Q-learning with those of the policy iteration scheme.
The performance of the proposed scheme was evaluated
against attackers of varying levels of sophistication.
In [19] and [20], multi-carrier power allocation was con-
sidered as an anti-jamming strategy. The games were also
formulated as zero-sum.
In [21], a study of the performance of fictitious
play as the learning algorithm in intelligent jamming
games was performed. In this work, we extend upon
the aforementioned ideas. A formulation of a proactive
jamming/anti-jamming game with intelligent players in an
increased action space created by combining frequency
hopping and power alteration is considered. Due to hop-
ping and transmission costs, the game is formulated as
non-zero-sum. Simulation results are used for finding
near-optimal strategies for a game with incomplete infor-
mation on an opponents’ payoffs and strategy. The results
are compared to the Nash equilibrium of the game. Often-
times, there exists a significant gap between the theoret-
ical contributions and the practical aspects of the radio
systems. In order to infer the parameters relevant for the
modelled game, thus bridging this gap, a set of experi-
ments is performed on the real-life software-defined radio
SDR/CR test bed.
We summarize the contributions and novelties of this
paper with respect to the state-of-the-art papers on the
application of game theory to intelligent jamming scenar-
ios as follows:
• We present the ideas of learning algorithms that
correspond to CRs with and without spectrum
sensing capabilities, comparing their performance.
• We compare the performance of the considered
learning algorithms for the modeled game with the
Nash equilibrium of the game.
• We consider an increased action space created by
combining two anti-jamming tactics.
• We use a real-life SDR/CR platform to infer
parameters that allow modeling the game in a more
realistic manner.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 describes the system model. Game formula-
tion along with equilibrium analysis and the description
of considered learning algorithms and decisioning poli-
cies is presented in Section 3. SDR/CR test bed setup
is described in Section 4, with experimental results pre-
sented in Section 5. Application to the modelled game
and the simulation results are given in Section 6, whereas
conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Systemmodel
Consider a simplistic two-way transmitter-receiver com-
munication occurring over one of the nf pre-defined
channels and a malicious user (jammer) that is trying to
disrupt the communication by creating narrowband inter-
ference. Transmitter and receiver are considered the pri-
mary users over all of the considered channels and are able
to tune to the same channel at a given time instance.With-
out the loss of generality, all of the channels are modelled
with the same parameters; however, it will become obvi-
ous that the proposed anti-jamming techniques would
be able to indirectly infer different channel parameters
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and fit these inferences into their decision-making
process.
Jammer is able to create a narrowband interference on
a single channel at a time, causing the deterioration of
the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) and sub-
sequently increase of the bit error rate (BER) on that
channel. It is assumed that the jamming attack is the only
possible reason for the deterioration of the channel qual-
ity, neglecting other possible sources of interference, as
well as the time-varying nature of channels, including
effects of the multipath propagation.
To mitigate the jamming effects and increase the SINR
at the receiver side over the threshold needed for success-
ful decoding, the transmitter may deploy a combination
of channel hopping and increasing its transmission power
(power alteration).
Both transmitter and jammer are able to make use of
the on-the-fly reconfigurability as well as the learning
prospectives of the cognitive radio technology. In dif-
ferent studied scenarios, both transmitter and jammer
may have different spectrum sensing capabilities. Follow-
ing that, two different learning algorithms are studied:
payoff-based adaptive play (PBAP), where players are not
necessarily embodied with spectrum sensing, and ficti-
tious play, where players are able to infer the actions of
the opponent in each step as a result of the deployed
spectrum sensing scheme. In addition, performance of the
proposed jamming/anti-jamming schemes is evaluated
against static, non-learning types of opponents.
Other assumptions and abstractions that were
taken in order to take a game-theoretical approach to
jamming/anti-jamming problems are given as follows:
• Considered channels are perfectly orthogonal and
non-overlapping, with frequency spacing between
them large enough to make any energy spillover
negligible.
• A discrete number of transmission powers were
considered for both the transmitter and the jammer.
• Following the previous assumption, an occurrence of
jamming is modelled as a discrete event, i.e., it always
occurs with success or failure, disregarding the
typical stochastic processing involved with the
occurrence of jamminga.
• Both transmitter and jammer are in continuous
transmission mode, i.e., they always have packets
ready to send.
• Jammer is available to create interference powerful
enough to successfully jam communications when
the transmitter is transmitting with its maximum
transmission power (provided that they are both
transmitting on the same channel at the time).
• All players maintain their relative positions as well as
antenna orientations with respect to each other.
3 Game formulation
The attack and defense problem is modelled as a multi-
stage proactive jamming/anti-jamming stochastic game.
A stochastic game [22] is played in a sequence of steps,
where at the end of each step, every player receives a pay-
off for the current step and chooses an action for the next
step that is expected to maximize his payoff. A player’s
payoff in each step is determined not only by his action
but also by the actions of all the other players in the game.
Collection of all of the actions that a player can take com-
prise his (finite) action set. The distribution of a player’s
choices of actions constitute his strategy. The strategymay
be fixed or may be updated according to the deployed
learning algorithm.
The proposed game is an extension of Markov decision
process (MDP), whose state transition probabilities may
be depicted as finite Markov chains.
The modelled game consists of two players: transmit-
ter T and jammer J . At the end of each step, every player
observes his payoff for the given step and decides either
to continue transmitting with the same power and at the
same frequency or to change one of them, or both. The
payoff consists of a summation of reward for the success-
ful transmission (jamming), penalty for the unsuccessful
transmission (jamming), and negative values related to
cost of transmission (jamming) and cost of frequency hop-
ping. Transmission (jamming) cost is related to the power
spent by the user for transmitting (jamming) in a given
step. Hopping cost may be explained by the fact that, after
changing the channel of the transceiver pair (jammer), a
certain time elapses before the communication may be
resumed (interference created) due to the settling time of
the radios or by other hardware constraints.
A generalized payoff at the end of the step s for transmit-
ter T is expressed as (1). Here, RT denotes the reward for
successful transmission, XT is the sustained fixed penalty
for the unsuccessful transmission, H is the hopping cost,
g(CT ) is a function that expresses the transmitter’s cost
of transmission when power CT is used, f T is the chan-
nel currently used by the transmitter-receiver pair, α = 1
if transmission is successful and α = 0 if not, and β = 1
if the transmitter decides to hop and β = 0 otherwise.
In this notation, subindices are used to denote steps, and
superindices to denote the players.
PTs
(
CTs , f Ts ,CJs , f Js
)





Similarly, jammer J ’s generalized payoff for the step s
is given as (2). Here, RJ is the jammer’s reward for suc-
cessful jamming, XJ is the sustained fixed penalty for




is the jammer’s cost of
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transmission when power CJ is used. Finally, γ = 1 if the
jammer decides to hop and 0 if it does not.
PJs
(
CTs , f Ts ,CJs , f Js
)
= RJ (1−α)−XJα−Hγ −g (CJs ) (2)
3.1 Equilibrium analysis of the game
Nash equilibrium is inarguably the central concept in
game theory, representing the most common notion of
rationality between the players involved in the game. It
is defined as the set of distributions of players’ strate-
gies designed in a way that no player has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its strategy distribution.
Let nf be a discrete number of channels available to both
players for channel hopping, and let nCT and nCJ be the
discrete number of transmission powers for the transmit-





pure strategies available to each player,
we define ST as the set of pure strategies of the transmitter
and SJ as the set of pure strategies of the jammer. Then,
x ∈ RST and y ∈ RSJ represent the mixed strategies of
the transmitter and jammer, respectively. By denoting the
payoff matrices of the transmitter and jammer as A and
B, respectively, a best response to the mixed strategy y of
the jammer is mixed strategy x∗ of the transmitter that
maximizes its expected payoff x∗ᵀAy. Similarly, the jam-
mer’s best response y∗ to the transmitter’s mixed strategy
x is the one that maximizes xᵀBy∗. A pair (x∗, y∗) that are
best responses to each other is a Nash equilibrium of the
bimatrix game, i.e., for any other combination of mixed
strategies (x, y) the following equations hold true:
xAy∗ᵀ ≤ x∗Ay∗ᵀ, (3)
x∗Byᵀ ≤ x∗By∗ᵀ. (4)
In 1951, Nash proved that all finite non-cooperative
games have at least one mixed Nash equilibrium [23]. Par-
ticularization of this proof for bimatrix games may be
given as follows [24]:
Let x and y be arbitrary pairs of mixed strategies for the
bimatrix game (A,B), and Ai· and B·j represent the ith col-














1 +∑k ck , (7)
y′j =
yj + dj
1 +∑k dk . (8)
Since T(x, y) = (x′, y′) is continuous and x′ and y′ are mixed
strategies, it can be shown that (x′, y′) = (x, y) if and only
if (x, y) is an equilibrium pair. Furthermore, if (x, y) is an
equilibrium pair, then for all i:
Ai·yᵀ ≤ xAyᵀ, (9)
hence ci = 0 (and similarly dj = 0 for all j), meaning that
x′ = x and y′ = y. Assume now that (x, y) is not an equilib-
rium pair, i.e., there either exists x such that xAyᵀ > xAyᵀ,
or there exists y such that xByᵀ > xByᵀ. Assuming the first
case, as xAyᵀ is a weighted average of Ai·yᵀ, there must
exist i for which Ai·yᵀ > xAyᵀ, and hence some ci > 0,
with
∑
k ck > 0. As xAyᵀ as a weighted average of Ai·yᵀ,
there must exist Ai·yᵀ ≤ xAyᵀ for some i such that xi > 0.
For this i, ci = 0, hence:
x′i =
xi + ci
1 +∑k ck < xi, (10)
and so x′ = x. In the same way, it can be shown that
y′ = y, leading to the conclusion that (x′, y′) = (x, y) if
and only if (x, y) is an equilibrium. As the transformation
T(x, y) = (x′, y′) is continuous, it must have a fixed point,
and so by applying Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [25], it
follows that this fixed point indeed represents an equilib-
rium point. This concludes the proof of the existence of
mixed-strategy equilibrium points in a bimatrix game.
However, efficient computation of equilibria points, as
well as proving uniqueness of an equilibrium, remains an
open question for many classes of games. Lemke-Howson
(LH) [26] is the most well-known algorithm for the com-
putation of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games and is
our algorithm of choice for finding the Nash equilibrium
strategies. A bimatrix game requires the game to be fully
defined by two payoff matrices (one for each player). Since
in our case the immediate payoff of every player in each
step depends not only on his own action and the action
of the opponent but also on the previous state of the
player (influence of the hopping cost), our game as a whole
cannot be represented by two deterministic payoff matri-
ces. For this reason, we divide the game into nf · nCT
subgames, where each subgame corresponds to a unique
combination of possible states of the transmitter and the
jammer. Since each subgame can be treated as the sep-
arate game in a bimatrix form, we proceed to apply the
LHmethod to find mixed strategy Nash equilibriums (one
per subgame). Hence, in each step, every player plays an
equilibrium strategy corresponding to that step. A union
of equilibria strategies of all the nf · nCT combinations of
the states within the game may be considered as the Nash
equilibrium of the game.
Gambit [27], an open-source collection of tools for solv-
ing computational problems in game theory, was used
for finding equilibrium points using the LH method. For
details on the implementation of the LH algorithm, an
interested reader is referred to [28].




where i = 1 . . . nf and
j = 1 . . . nCT is a nondegenerate bimatrix game. Then, fol-
lowing Shapley’s proof from [26], we may conclude that
there exists an odd number of equilibria for each subgame.
In [29], the upper bound on the number of equilibria in
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d × d bimatrix games was shown to be equal to 2.41dd1/2 ;
however, the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium may still be
proven only for several special classes of bimatrix games.
Here, we provide conditions that the bimatrix game has
to satisfy in order to have a unique completely mixed
Nash equilibrium. Completely mixed Nash equilibrium
is an equilibrium in which the supports of each of the
mixed equilibrium strategies are equal to the number of
available pure strategies (i.e., each strategy from a mixed
strategy set is played with a non-zero probability). As
shown by [30], whose proof we re-state, a bimatrix game
(A,B) whose matrices A and B are a square, has a unique
completely mixed Nash equilibrium if det(A, e) = 0 and
det(B, e) = 0, i.e.:
det(A, e) · det(B, e) = 0, (11)
where e is a column vector with all entries 1.







Then, the equilibrium strategies of the players are given
as:
x∗i = − detB
i
det(B, e) , (13)
y∗i = − detAidet(A, e) , (14)
where Bi (Ai) is the matrix of B (A) with all entries of the
ith column (row) replaced by 1.
Let us now suppose that (x∗, y∗) is an equilibrium point
of the bimatrix game (A,B), where x∗ is completely mixed.
Then, every pure strategy would give that player the same
payoff P against the opponent’s strategy y∗, i.e.:
Ay∗ = Pe. (15)
Since y∗ is a vector of probabilities,
eᵀy∗ = 1. (16)













Following the assumption det(A, e) = 0 and by applying
Cramer’s rule, it follows from (17) that (14) is true for (i =
1, 2, . . . , n) (in our case, n = nCT · nf ). Similarly, the same
holds for x∗i. As shown in [30]:
det(Ai, e) = det(Ai − eeᵀ) − det(Ai) = −detAi, (18)
hence (13) and (14) are shown to be true. This concludes
the proof of the uniqueness of the completely mixed
equilibrium.
It may be computationally shown that all of the nf · nCT
subgames constructed within the considered game satisfy
(11). Furthermore, by observing the Markov state chains
corresponding to the equilibrium points found by the
LH method, it may indeed be observed that supp(x∗) =
supp(y∗) = nf · nCT , i.e., the equilibriums are completely
mixed. Trying to find multiple equilibria for each sub-
game using other computational methods available within
[27] has also resulted in a single (completely mixed) equi-
librium for each subgame: empirical evaluation of these
results, based on the algorithms to find all possible equi-
librium points of the bimatrix game, further points to the
existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for each subgame.
One of the common criticisms of using computational
algorithms such as LH for finding Nash equilibria is that
they fail to realistically capture the way that the players
involved in the gamemay reach the equilibrium point. For
this reason, it is useful to discuss the payoff performance
and the convergence properties to Nash equilibrium of the
algorithms realistically used for learning in games. This
discussion is done for twomulti-agent learning algorithms
considered within this work: fictitious play (Section 3.2.1)
and payoff-based adaptive play (Section 3.2.2).
3.2 Learning algorithms
Learning algorithms forMDPs have been extensively stud-
ied in the past [31,32]. Based on their spectrum occupancy
inference capabilities, an illustrating example of the corre-
sponding learning algorithms for the considered game and
the dimensionality of the action space is given in Figure 1.
For CRs not equipped with spectrum sensing capa-
bilities (geolocation/database-driven CRs and CRs utiliz-
ing beacon rays), payoff-based reinforcement algorithms
impose themselves as the optimal viable learning algo-
rithms. In these cases, each player is able to evaluate
the payoff received in every step and modify its strategy
accordingly.
CRs able to perform energy detection spectrum sens-
ing, in addition, also have the possibility of observing their
opponents’ actions in each step (influenced possibly by
the accuracy of the deployed spectrum sensing mech-
anism). By incorporating these observations into their
future decision-making process, the players may build and
update a belief regarding the opponents’ strategy distribu-
tion. This learning mechanism is called fictitious play.
Finally, CRs able to perform feature detection spectrum
sensing may recognize important parameters of the oppo-
nent’s signal and use these observations to their advan-
tage. Since various waveforms exhibit different jamming
and anti-jamming properties, depending mainly on their
modulation and employed coding (see, for example, [33]),
increased action space could consist of switching between
multiple modulation types or coding techniques.
In this paper, we focus our analysis on the first two
cases. Algorithm 1 illustrates the general formulation of
the game. It can be seen how, in every step, each player
takes a decision ds for his next action based on their
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expected utility Ps = E[Ps|P1:s−1] under PBAP or Ps =
E[Ps|P1:s−1, ss1:s−1] under fictitious play. Received payoffs
Ps are calculated for each player using (1) and (2). There-
after, spectrum sensing is performed and the expected
payoff is updated with the new information available.
To simplify explanation of the learning strategies and
Algorithm 1, it is assumed that both players perform the
spectrum sensing step; however, the result of this step is
used only under fictitious play framework. For the players
with perfect spectrum sensing capabilities, ssTs = dTs and
ssJs = dJs .
Algorithm 1 Game pseudocode
1: function TRANSMITTER JAMMER GAME
2: nSteps ← Number of steps
3: RT ,RJ ← Rewards
4: CT ,CJ ← Cost of hopping
5:
6: Initialize the expected utilities
7: s ← 0
8: while s < nSteps do
9: dTs ← Decide Transmitter  Section 3.3
10: dJs ← Decide Jammer  Section 3.3
11: PTs ← Transmitter utility  Equation 1
12: PJs ← Jammer utility  Equation 2
13: ssdJs ← Transmitter Spectrum Sensing








)  Section 3.2
17: s ← s + 1
18: end while
19: end function
Note from the pseudocode that the game consists of two
main parts: the learning algorithm, in charge of updating
the expected payoffs, and the decisioning policy, which
uses the available observations to decide upon the future
actions.
Let us assume that in step s the transmitter was trans-
mitting with power CTs on the frequency f Ts . Using one of
the decisioning policies described in Section 3.3, its action
in the next step constitutes of transmitting with power
CTs+1 on frequency f Ts+1. We denote this action as a list of
four elements dTs =
[
CTs , f Ts ,CTs+1, f Ts+1
]
for the transmit-
ter and the equivalent values dJs =
[









Fictitious play [34] is an iterative learning algorithm
where, at every step, each player updates his belief about
the stochastic distributions of the strategies of the other
players in the game. The application of a learning mech-
anism based on fictitious play to the modelled game is
constructed under the assumption that the player is nec-
essarily endowed with the spectrum sensing capabilities,
allowing him to infer the actions of the other player. A pay-
off of a particular action given the player’s current state
and the opponent’s action is deterministic and may be
calculated using (1) and (2) for transmitter and jammer,
respectively. If the player has the information regarding
the opponents’ action in each step, then it is possible to
calculate the expected utility more precisely, by accessing
the history of the opponents’ actions. This is particu-
larly true for the jammer because of the higher number
of non-jammed states compared to the states of success-
ful jamming. Hence, learning the transmitter’s pattern as
soon and with as much precision as possible makes a
significant difference to the overall payoff. This updating
process is denoted in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Expected utility update under fictitious
play
1: function FICTIOUS EXPECTED UTILITY UPDATE
2: powers ← Available powers
3: freqs ← Available frequencies
4: SS ← Opponent’s state [Spectrum Sensing]
5: flist ← Opponent’s previous states
6:
7: flist.append(SS)
8: for d ∈ possible actions do
9: sum ← 0
10: for C, f ∈ powers, freqs do
11: N ← count (C, f )in flist
12: sum ← sum + N · P(d[3] , d[4] ,C, f )
13: end for
14: PTs+1(d) = sums
15: end for
16: end function
It is known that the convergence of the fictitious play
to Nash equilibrium is guaranteed only for several spe-
cial cases, such as zero-sum games, non-degenerate 2×n
games with generic payoffs, games solvable by iterated
strict dominance and weighted potential games. For other
types of games, including the game considered within this
work, convergence to Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed,
and even when it converges, the time needed to run the
algorithm to convergence may be very long due to the
problem being polynomial parity arguments on directed
graphs (PPAD)-complete [35]. This has led to the intro-
duction of the concept of approximate Nash equilibrium
(-equilibrium). Here,  is a small positive quantity rep-
resenting the maximum increase in payoff that a player
could gain by choosing to follow a different strategy.
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Figure 1 Spectrum sensing capability vs. learning mechanism and action space.
Author in [36] has shown that fictitious play achieves
the worst-case guarantee of  = (r + 1)/(2r) (where r is
the number of FP iterations) and in reality provides even
better approximation results. Furthermore, as recently
shown in [37], fictitious play may in some cases outper-
form any actual Nash equilibrium - for this reason, it is
useful to study the performance of the FP algorithm in
terms of the average and final payoff compared to the
Nash equilibrium.
3.2.2 Payoff-based adaptive play
Payoff-based adaptive play [38] is a form of reinforcement
learning algorithm, where it is assumed that the player
does not have access to the information about the state
of the other player and relies on the history of his own
previous payoffs. The expected utility of ds given previous
payoffs is given by Equation 19.
Ps+1(ds) = E[Ps(ds)|P1:s−1(ds)]= Ps(ds) · s + Ps(ds)s + 1 (19)
PBAP has been shown to converge to Nash equilibrium
for zero-sum games [39]. For general finite two-player
games, it was shown to converge to close-to-optimal solu-
tions in polynomial time [40].
In addition to comparing the performance of the
PBAP to the computed Nash equilibrium strategy from
Section 3.1, of particular interest to this work is the com-
parison to the performance of the FP. This comparison
should reflect the benefit that each player gains by being
equipped with the spectrum sensing algorithm (FP) over
not being equipped with it (PBAP).
3.3 Decisioning policies
A decisioning policy of the learning algorithm corre-
sponds to the set of rules that the player uses to select his
future actions.
3.3.1 Greedy decisioning policy
The most intuitive decisioning policy consists of always
choosing the action that is expected to yield the highest
possible value based on the current estimates - the so-
called greedy decisioning policy [41]. However, a greedy
method is overly biased and may easily lead the learn-
ing algorithm to ‘get stuck’ in local optimal solutions. An
example of this is given in Figure 2, where both play-
ers are employing the greedy decisioning policy. Here,
each player fairly quickly learns the ‘best response’ to an
opponent’s action and starts relying on using it. Then, a
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Figure 2 Expected payoff over time for the greedy decisioning policy and payoff-based adaptive play learning algorithm.
significant amount of time has to pass before his expected
payoff for the given action drops enough that another
action starts being considered as ‘best response’, where
in the meantime significant payoff losses are sustained.
This could partially be mitigated by introducing temporal
forgiveness into the learning algorithm.
3.3.2 Stochastically sampled decisioning policy
Another common approach to this issue is choosing a
stochastically sampled policy (also known as -greedy pol-
icy, [42]) where, at each step, a randomly sampled action
is taken with a probability p. We propose a variation of
the stochastically sampled policy where sampling is per-
formed by scaling the expected payoff value of each action
to the minimum possible payoff for the game. For a min-
imum payoff PMIN and n actions with expected payoffs,
P(1) . . .P(n) the probability of choosing an action d is
given by (20):
p(d) = P(d) − PMIN∑n
k=1 P(k) − PMIN
(20)
4 Experimental setup
In order to infer the parameters related to the occurrence
of jamming and to be able to extract the physical parame-
ters relevant for the game, a set of experiments using the
real-life SDR test bed [43] is performed.
4.1 Test bed description
A coaxial test bed is implemented for the frequency range
of interest. The coaxial test bed eliminates the typical
uncertainties characteristic to wireless transmission and
allows for repeatability of the experiments. An imple-
mented test bed, shown in Figure 3, consists of two inter-
connected SWAVE handheld (HH) SDRs [44], and the
dual directional coupler with 50-dB attenuation placed
in between, emulating the channel. SWAVE HH is an
SDR terminal designed to operate in very high frequency
(VHF) (30 to 88 MHz) and ultra high frequency (UHF)
(225 to 512 MHz) bands. It is compliant with the Soft-
ware Communications Architecture (SCA) 2.2.2 standard
and supports a multitude of legacy as well as new wave-
forms. Each HH is connected to the personal computer
(PC) via Ethernet as well as the RS-232 serial connection.
Interfaces between the HH and the PC are illustrated in
Figure 4.
Ethernet connection is used for the external control of
HH’s transmission-related parameters. Using the Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) v3, values of all
of the relevant parameters - for our purposes transmission
frequency and transmission power - may be read out and
altered on-the-fly.
Serial connection is used for transferring unprocessed
spectrum data from the HH to the PC. There, this data
is analyzed by the developed energy detection spectrum
sensing mechanism and outputted to the spectrum intel-
ligence mechanism (currently under development, [45]).
Figure 3 Implemented coaxial test bed.
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Figure 4 Flow diagram of the interfaces HH-PC.
4.2 Jammer implementation
In order to infer influence of intentional interference on
the communication, a vector signal generator is used as
a jammer emulator. Interference of various types (pulse
tones, multitones, Global System for Mobile Commu-
nications (GSM) signal, additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN)), occupied bandwidth, and power may be cre-
ated and injected in the channel.
5 Experimental methodology and results
The measurements and parameters relevant for the con-
structed game are:
• Impact of interference on the quality of
communication link,
• Transmission levels,
• Battery life of the HHs for varying transmission levels
• Number of considered channels,
• Time needed to perform frequency hopping,
• Spectrum sensing time,
• Spectrum sensing detection accuracy.
The connection between the HHs is established using
the soldier broadband waveform (SBW). SBW is a
wideband multi-hop mobile ad hoc network (MANET)
waveform, encompassed with self-establishment and self-
awareness of the network structure and topology. The
waveform’s bandwidth is 1.3 MHz, and channel spacing
is 2 MHz - large enough to disregard the influence
of potential energy spillover between adjacent chan-
nels. Experiments are done at 300 MHz central carrier
frequency.
Interference is created by injecting a pulse-shaped signal
onto the central carrier frequency of the HHs. To mea-
sure the impact of interference, a set of BER tests was
performed for varying levels of transmission power and
varying levels of interference. Results for three discrete
values of transmission power: −12, 4, and 7 dBW, respec-
tively, are presented in Figure 5. By setting the threshold
for the communication failure at BER = 10−1, corre-
sponding interference powers for the observed values of
transmission powers are found, equaling to: 1, 6, and 9
dBW, respectively.
Figure 5 SINR vs BER.
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Energy detection spectrum sensing is done in the fol-
lowing way: every 1.1 s, a burst of 8,192 samples from the
HH’s ADC is sent over the serial port to the PC. These
samples, corresponding to 120 MHz of the bandwidth
scanned around the HH’s center frequency, are then con-
verted into the frequency domain. The data may then be
analyzed by the spectrum intelligence algorithm. This data
processing currently lasts around 0.2 s, making the whole
spectrum sensing cycle last approximately 1.3 s.
Currently, the test bed does not have the spectrum
intelligence algorithm developed, whose task is processing
spectrum sensing data related to the scanned wideband
signal and concluding on the presence of narrowband
waveforms in it. Hence, presently it is impossible to infer
the detection accuracy of the spectrum sensing. For these
purposes, various levels of detection accuracy manifesting
in varying percentages of misdetection will be considered
for the simulation results. An interested reader is referred
to [46] for experimental results on the energy detection
accuracy.
Frequency hopping is performed by issuing the appro-
priate SNMP SET command over the Ethernet port to
the HH. The action of processing the SNMP request and
changing the frequency takes 0.3 s, during which the radio
is not transmitting. The frequency settling time of the
radios is in this case negligibleb.
HH’s battery time for states of continuous packet data
stream (packets are generated by the BER test function)
are measured for the identified relevant values of the
transmission power of−12, 4, and 7 dBW, equaling to 120,
94, and 90 min, respectively. The results for the relevant
transmission powers of the supposed jammer were then
linearly interpolated from the aforementioned, equaling to
99, 92, and 87 min, respectively.
The relevant parameters are summarized in Table 1.
6 Application to the proposed game and
simulation results
Starting from the general expressions for the payoffs of the
transmitter and the jammer given in Equations 1 and 2,
a short discussion is offered on the interpretation of the
parameters measured in the previous section and the
Table 1 Overview of the inferred parameters
Transmitter Jammer
Considered frequencies (MHz) (300, 302.65, 305.3) (300, 302.65, 305.3)
Transmitting powers (dBW) (−12, 4, 7) (1, 6, 9)
Battery life for TX powers (min) (120, 94, 90) (99, 92, 87)
Spectrum sensing time (s) 1.3 1.3
Frequency hopping time (s) 0.3 0.3
Signal detection accuracy (%) (50, 70, 90, 100) (50, 70, 90, 100)
feasibility of their application to the proposed game. The
discussion is followed by the simulation results.
6.1 Adaptation of the measured parameters to the
proposed game
One of the principal problems with introducing the exper-
imental parameters in the theoretical model is the process
of aligning the parameters with different units (namely,
Watts and seconds), used in Equations 1 and 2. The first
and second terms represent the transmission (jamming)
reward and penalty, which may be defined arbitrarily. For
the simulation purposes, we define them as R = 1 and
X = −R, respectively.
Hopping cost, the third term of the equation, can be
expressed as a function of the reward. If the hopping is
performed and the transmission is successful, the final
utility is decreased by the hopping cost, denoted as Rhαβ .
Here, h = 0,31,3 is the proportion of the time step where
the transmission is not taking place due to the hopping
process. An increase of the transmission power, on the
other hand, directly influences battery life. For this pur-
pose, transmission cost may be described as a function of
battery life of the radio, as denoted in (21). Maximum bat-
tery life corresponds to the minimum transmission power
of −12 dBW and equals to Bmax = 120 min. Transmis-
sion costs of higher transmission powers are then scaled






Finally, for each step s, expression (1) may be re-written
as (22) and expression (2) as (23) for the transmitter and
jammer, respectively.
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Figure 6 Number of jamming occurrences while the number of channels increase.
Following the experiments denoted in Figure 5, the
occurrence of jamming in step s for the three couplets
of transmission powers CT = (−12, 4, 7) and CJ =
(1, 6, 9) can be defined as (24). An overview of the adapted
parameters is given in Table 2.
α =
{
1 if Ts > Js or f Ts = f Js
0 if Ts ≤ Js and f Ts = f Js .
(24)
6.2 Simulation results
In this subsection, we analyze the performance of the con-
sidered learning algorithms under the proposed game and
compare it to the computed Nash equilibrium. All the
games are constructed using the parameters denoted in
Table 2, unless indicated otherwise. Default number of
simulation steps is 10,000. Each simulation is repeated 100
times, and the points are averaged. It was verified that
each pair of the constructed payoff matrices satisfy condi-
tion (13), guaranteeing uniqueness of a completely mixed
Nash equilibrium. In several games, a comparison with
the player whose strategy is fully randomized, i.e., taken
actions are irrespective of the observations, is performed.
Figure 6 shows the percentage of occurrences of suc-
cessful jamming for different dimensions of the players’
action sets, from games with one channel and one trans-
mission power, to four channels and three transmission
powers. In all games, transmitter is playing FP, whereas
jammer is alternating between FP (full lines) and random
strategy (dashed lines). Benefit of having the learning algo-
rithm for the jammer is particularly prominent for the
low-dimensional games, where the transmitter is able to
adapt to any static strategy of the jammer (including fully
randomized) and start exploiting it significantly.
To verify the importance of spectrum sensing capa-
bilities corresponding to the fictitious play learning
algorithm, we propose the analysis of the overall utility of
Figure 7 Overall payoff of the transmitter with different probabilities of misdetection.
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Figure 8 Overall payoff of the jammer with different probabilities of misdetection.
each player when the opponent is utilizing payoff-based
adaptive play. Furthermore, in order to understand how
the spectrum sensing accuracy affects the performance,
we consider a spectrum sensing mechanism with a certain
probability of misdetection. For the simplicity of analy-
sis, we disregard the fact that the misdetection probability
realistically depends on the instantaneous SINR. Figures 7
and 8 show the results of these simulations for transmitter
and jammer, respectively. In the left side of the figures, the
overall payoff obtained during the game for each player is
shown. For the visualization purposes, a trend is removed
in the right side of the figures.
From Figure 7, it is evident that the compared schemes
perform almost equally - regardless of the misdetection
probability - for the transmitter. This points to the conclu-
sion that the optimal strategy of the transmitter under the
considered game when the jammer is endowed with the
learning algorithm is not too far from ‘random’. On the
other hand, Figure 8 points once again to the significance
of the spectrum sensing for the jammer side, as its over-
all payoff is significantly higher when utilizing fictitious
play, compared to payoff-based adaptive play, even for
sub-optimal spectrum sensing mechanisms (mechanisms
with higher probabilities of misdetection).
In order to study this occurrence in more detail and in
order to ease-up the comparison, we next present these
results in the forms of normal distributions. Figure 9
shows the performance of the transmitter using PBAP
learning algorithm in the upper part and fictitious play
in the bottom part, for varying learning algorithms of the
jammer. Analogously, Figure 10 shows the performance
of the jammer employing PBAP learning algorithm in
the upper part and fictitious play in the bottom part,
for different learning algorithms of the transmitter. The
title of each subplot denotes the learning algorithm fol-
lowed by the observed player while colors of the lines are
Figure 9 Difference in the overall payoff for the transmitter under different learning policies.
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Figure 10 Difference in the overall payoff for the jammer under different learning policies.
a
b
Figure 11 State-groupedMarkov chain with the default parameters (a,b).
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used to differentiate between the learning strategies of the
opponent.
The results verify that the performance of the trans-
mitter is very similar while using PBAP (top part) and
fictitious play (bottom part). The exception is the case
when the jammer employs fictitious learning. In this case,
the transmitter will benefit slightly more by also deploy-
ing fictitious play in order to learn to infer the jammer’s
actions as soon as possible. The results for the jammer
confirm our intuition - significantly better results for both
cases are obtained using fictitious play.
Next, we aim to show how evolution of the game is influ-
enced when the parameters of the game are modified. As
explained previously, the state/action space of the players
can be depicted by Markov chains, where each Markov
state represents the current state of the player, and each
edge the probability of taking an action leading to the new
state. A graphical representation of the Markov transition
probabilities is difficult to interpret for the full set of states
of high-action-space games (higher than 2 × 2). Some
examples of the full Markov chains for small action spaces
may be found in [21]. This problem can partially be alle-
viated by creating state-groupedMarkov chains, as shown
in Figure 11a,b. Here, the number refers to the ordinal
number of transmission power (i.e., ‘1’= −12 dBW for
the transmitter, ‘1’= 1 dBW for the jammer, etc.). Actions
pertaining to frequency hopping are grouped and marked
as ‘h’, while actions of staying on the same frequency are
marked as ‘s’.
Then, the simulations are done for two extreme val-
ues of the hopping cost: 0.01 and 1.3, while keeping all
other parameters the same. Figure 12a,b shows the differ-
ences in final stochastic distributions of the transmitter’s
strategies. As expected, an evident trend of the learning
algorithm focuses on placing more importance on action
‘s’ as the hopping cost increases.
Stochastic distributions of the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium for the transmitter and jammer under the
default game parameters may also be shown in the form of
the state-grouped Markov chains, as done in Figure 13a,b.
Finally, we perform the evaluation of the convergence
to Nash equilibrium in terms of the overall payoff for the
considered learning algorithms.
Figure 14 shows the convergence to Nash equilibrium
in terms of payoff for fictitious play. Here, the red line
shows the payoff obtained when both players are playing
Nash equilibrium strategies. The blue line shows the case
when the transmitter is playing the Nash strategy and jam-
mer is deploying fictitious play. As can be seen for the
jammer in the bottom part of the figure, fictitious play is
a
b
Figure 12 State-groupedMarkov chain for different hopping cost (a,b).




Figure 13 State-groupedMarkov chain for the transmitter and jammer playing Nash equilibrium (a,b).
Figure 14 Comparison of fictitious play to Nash equilibrium strategy.
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Figure 15 Comparison of PBAP to Nash equilibrium strategy.
able to obtain performance nearly as good as the strat-
egy played in Nash equilibrium, when the opponent is
playing according to Nash. Similar conclusions, although
once again less prominent, may be drawn from the upper
part of the figure for the transmitter playing fictitious
play and jammer playing according to Nash equilibrium.
The results are compared to the flow of the game when
both players are playing according to fictitious play (black
line). The results correspond to the results of [36] -
fictitious play indeed seems to converge in the payoff to
-equilibrium.
Similar results are obtained for the PBAP when faced
against the Nash strategy. Figure 15 shows the conver-
gence comparison for the jammer.
7 Conclusions
In the paper, a cognitive radio stochastic jamming/anti-
jamming game between two players was modelled.
Increased action space of the anti-jamming algorithm
was created by combining power alteration and chan-
nel hopping. Two learning algorithms were considered:
payoff-based adaptive learning corresponding to radios
without spectrum sensing capabilities and fictitious play
which may be utilized by the spectrum-sensing radios. In
addition to their performance, their convergence proper-
ties to Nash equilibrium in terms of overall payoff and
empirical distributions of the strategies were studied. In
order to narrow the gap between the theoretical con-
straints inherent to game theory and practical aspects of
the communication systems, relevant parameters for the
game were inferred by performing a set of experiments
using the real-life software-defined radio test bed. The
major finding of the paper is the importance of the spec-
trum sensing endowment for the jamming side, compared
to relatively insignificant benefits for the transmitting side
in proactive anti-jamming games. In addition, evolution
dynamics for different game parameters were presented.
Deployment of the feature detectors is a logical next
step in the arms race between the narrowband jammers
and the anti-jamming systems. However, introduction of
the additional parameters under the currently proposed
framework would increase the action space to the point
of infeasibility for analysis. For this purpose, future work
will focus on finding ways for clusterizing overly com-
plex action spaces and further optimizing their graphical
representations by the means of state-grouped Markov
chains.
In addition, once that the deployed SDR/CR test bed
becomes endowed with the spectrum intelligence and
automatic-reconfigurability capabilities, it will be used for
testing and verification of the adaptation of the proposed
game-theoretical schemes.
Endnotes
aThis assumption may be built upon the existence of
the threshold effect, characteristic for digital
communication systems, where there is a certain SINR
below which the BER significantly rises, and the
communication systems perform poorly [33].
bIn the cases of devices able to perform fast frequency
hopping, and whose spectrum sensing and processing
time is comparable to the frequency settling time, or in
the games with smaller step sizes, this parameter would
play a difference and should not be disregarded.
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